Beyond The Headlines: The Changing Face Of The DSS Under Ajayi

By Olumide Bajulaiye

There is an unusual way to look at Oluwatosin Adeola Ajayi.
Not through the arrests.
Not through the security alerts.
Not even through the familiar language of intelligence successes and counter-terrorism operations.
Look instead at what happens when one of Nigeria’s most secretive institutions begins to explain itself, examine its own methods and confront some of its inherited practices.
That may be the more revealing story of Ajayi’s tenure as Director-General of the Department of State Services.
The DSS cannot, by its nature, tell Nigerians everything it knows. Intelligence depends on secrecy. Its operations are often invisible, its successes rarely public, and much of the work that protects national security never becomes a headline.
That makes institutional reform inside the DSS particularly difficult.
It also makes what Ajayi says he is attempting particularly interesting.
The DG Who Came From Inside
Ajayi is not an outsider brought in to reform the DSS from a distance.
He is a product of the institution.
Reports on his career say he joined the intelligence service as a cadet officer and rose through the ranks before becoming Director-General in August 2024. Vanguard described him as the first DSS cadet to rise to the position.
That experience gives him something a newcomer cannot easily acquire: an intimate understanding of the institution he now leads.
He knows its strengths.
He knows its weaknesses.
He knows its traditions.
And, importantly, he knows where change can realistically begin.
Ajayi has described his approach as building on the successes of previous administrations while correcting weaknesses and strengthening existing capabilities.
That is not a revolution for the sake of a headline.
It is institutional reform from within.
And perhaps that is precisely what an organisation as sensitive as the DSS requires.
A Different Emphasis
One of the most striking aspects of Ajayi’s public statements is the emphasis he places on accountability and professionalism alongside security.
In a September 2026 interview, he identified law enforcement, inter-agency synergy, accountability, respect for human rights, and administrative reforms among his priorities.
That matters.
The effectiveness of an intelligence agency cannot be measured only by arrests or operations.
The real strength of such an institution also lies in the quality of its intelligence, the professionalism of its personnel, the legality of its actions and the confidence it inspires.
Ajayi’s account of the Pat Utomi matter illustrates this approach. He said the DSS sought judicial interpretation in the controversy surrounding an alleged attempt to establish a shadow government.
Whatever one’s view of the underlying matter, the institutional significance is clear: a contentious national-security question was taken into the judicial arena.
That is an important reminder that security and the rule of law need not be opposing principles.
The Reform Nigerians May Not Have Noticed
Perhaps the strongest evidence of institutional change is found not in spectacular operations but in decisions that rarely make front pages.
In June 2026, the DSS announced a review of old watch-list actions, including some dating back to the military era.
The Service said the exercise was intended to prevent citizens from continuing to suffer the consequences of outdated watch-list decisions and to provide a pathway for review and delisting.
It cited the delisting of International Press Centre Executive Director Lanre Arogundade after more than a decade on the watch-list.
That is easy to overlook.
There was no raid.
No weapons display.
No dramatic security briefing.
But there is something significant about an intelligence organisation examining decisions inherited from previous eras and asking whether they remain justified.
Sometimes reform is not about what an institution starts doing.
Sometimes it is about what it decides it no longer needs to do.
That kind of reform may be less visible, but it goes directly to the relationship between state power and citizens.
Cleaning The House
Ajayi’s emphasis on internal discipline is another important part of the story.
The DSS announced in November 2025 that 115 personnel had been dismissed over a period as part of its reforms and warned the public about former personnel allegedly impersonating serving operatives.
The message is straightforward: membership of the Service cannot be a licence for misconduct.
That principle matters particularly in an intelligence organisation because its personnel exercise powers that ordinary citizens do not possess.
An agency cannot credibly demand public confidence while ignoring misconduct within its own ranks.
The badge cannot become a licence.
The uniform cannot become immunity.
And investigative authority cannot become permission to operate outside the law.
By publicly drawing attention to internal discipline, Ajayi has placed an important part of institutional reform where it belongs — inside the organisation itself.
Opening A Difficult Conversation
Ajayi’s relationship with the media also deserves attention.
The Nigeria Union of Journalists honoured him as its Man of the Year in June 2026, highlighting collaboration between security institutions and journalists.
The award itself is less important than what it represents.
Security agencies and journalists operate from fundamentally different positions.
Journalists seek information.
Intelligence agencies protect information.
That tension will always exist.
The question is whether the relationship becomes permanently adversarial or whether both sides can recognise their different responsibilities.
A DSS that can engage journalists without compromising legitimate intelligence is potentially better positioned to explain its role to the public.
And Ajayi appears to have recognised that communication is itself part of modern security management.
Investing In The Institution
There is another part of the Ajayi story that receives considerably less attention: the institution behind the intelligence.
In his September interview, he pointed to new office accommodation, staff and transit facilities, creches, operational vehicles, surveillance equipment, sporting facilities and improved medical infrastructure.
These are not glamorous achievements.
But intelligence ultimately depends on people.
Technology can assist an intelligence officer.
A vehicle can improve mobility.
A surveillance system can expand capability.
But professional intelligence still depends on trained, motivated and properly supported personnel.
For an agency expected to protect the country under extraordinary pressure, investing in the people and structures behind that mission is part of security itself.
The Measure That Cannot Always Be Seen
The temptation with security chiefs is to count arrests, weapons recovered and operations conducted.
But intelligence is different.
Some of its greatest successes are events that never happen.
A bomb that never explodes.
A kidnapping that never occurs.
A violent confrontation prevented before it begins.
A plot detected before it becomes an operation.
The public sees the announcement.
It does not see the intelligence behind it.
It sees the arrest.
It does not see the surveillance that preceded it.
It sees the security operation.
It may never know the threat that was prevented.
That is why the more revealing question about Ajayi’s tenure is not simply how many operations have been conducted.
It is what kind of institution he is trying to build.
One that combines intelligence capability with professionalism.
One that treats accountability as part of security rather than an obstacle to it.
One that recognises that discipline must begin within the Service.
One that understands that legitimate secrecy and public confidence can coexist.
Beyond The Headlines
There is already enough in the public record to make Ajayi’s tenure an important case study in institutional reform: the review of old watch-list decisions, internal disciplinary measures, emphasis on inter-agency cooperation, engagement with the media, investment in personnel and infrastructure, and the stated willingness to use judicial processes in contentious cases.
None of these should be exaggerated into proof that every problem within the DSS has disappeared.
Nigeria’s security challenges remain substantial.
But neither should these developments be dismissed simply because they lack the drama of an arrest or a security operation.
Some of the most consequential reforms in a security institution happen quietly.
Ajayi inherited an institution built around secrecy.
His challenge is to strengthen its effectiveness without allowing secrecy to become a substitute for accountability.
Nigerians may never know everything the DSS knows.
Nor should they.
But they can reasonably expect an intelligence service that is increasingly professional in how it exercises the extraordinary powers entrusted to it.
That is where the significance of Ajayi’s tenure may ultimately lie.
Not merely in the operations Nigerians heard about, but in the institutional changes they rarely saw.
Because for an intelligence service, the ultimate challenge is not simply to protect the nation from threats that Nigerians can see.
It is to build enough professionalism, discipline and accountability that Nigerians can have confidence in the work they cannot see.
And that may be the most consequential change taking place inside the DSS under Ajayi.

Olumide Bajulaiye is the Publisher, Daily Dispatch Newspaper.