Fayemi, Fashola And IBB: Three Faces Of Political Strategy

By Olumide Bajulaiye

Few Nigerian politicians have travelled as unusual a political road as Kayode Fayemi. From the trenches of the June 12 pro-democracy struggle to the Ekiti governorship, the Nigeria Governors’ Forum and the inner contestations of the APC, Fayemi has repeatedly operated at the intersection of activism, intellectual politics and power.

His political style is particularly interesting when placed beside two very different figures: former Lagos governor Babatunde Fashola and former military president Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida.
The three men belong to different generations and political traditions. Yet they share one characteristic: an emphasis on strategy rather than political noise. The difference lies in how that strategy has been deployed.

Kayode Fayemi emerged nationally during the June 12 struggle. He was associated with Radio Kudirat and the wider pro-democracy movement that challenged the military government of Sani Abacha. His return from exile was therefore not the beginning of his political career, but the continuation of a political struggle that had already given him a national profile.
That background distinguished him from politicians who entered electoral politics directly.

When Fayemi eventually moved into partisan politics, he joined the Action Congress political family associated with Bola Tinubu. His emergence as the AC candidate in Ekiti and his subsequent struggle to reclaim the governorship after the 2007 election placed him firmly within the emerging opposition political establishment in the South-West.

His political relationship with Tinubu, however, later became more complicated.
Fayemi And Fashola: Different Routes From The Same Political Family
Babatunde Fashola represents a contrasting model.

Fashola rose through the Lagos political structure, first as Tinubu’s chief of staff and later as governor. His public image has generally been associated with technocratic administration, legal training and relatively restrained political communication.
Fayemi, by contrast, came into politics through opposition activism and intellectual engagement. His political identity was therefore formed partly outside government before he entered government.

That distinction became visible after both men had served as governors and later joined the federal government.
Fashola’s approach has often emphasised institutional engagement and private conversation where disagreements arise. Fayemi has been more willing to articulate criticisms publicly and to position himself within broader political debates.

Neither approach necessarily tells us what either man ultimately intends. But it reveals two different political languages: Fashola’s politics tends towards administrative restraint, while Fayemi’s is more rooted in contestation and ideological positioning.

Where IBB Comes In
Ibrahim Babangida presents an entirely different model.

Babangida’s political career was built inside the military establishment, but his defining characteristic as a political operator was his ability to maintain relationships across competing camps and to keep several political possibilities open simultaneously.

That is the sense in which comparisons between Fayemi and IBB can be useful—but only as an analogy of political method, not as an assertion that their careers or ideologies are equivalent.

Both have been associated with politics in which silence, ambiguity and positioning can sometimes communicate as much as public declarations.

IBB’s famous political style earned him the nickname “Maradona” because of his reputation for manoeuvring between competing interests. Fayemi’s detractors have similarly portrayed him as a politician who rarely reveals his entire hand.
But there is an important difference.

IBB operated from the commanding position of a military head of state. Fayemi has operated within competitive electoral politics, where he has had to build alliances, win elections, negotiate party structures and periodically retreat when the numbers were against him.

The 2022–23 APC Contest
The clearest example came during the APC’s presidential contest ahead of the 2023 election.
Fayemi was then chairman of the Nigeria Governors’ Forum and entered the presidential race. His position gave him access to governors across the country and potentially placed him in a strategic position within the party.

But the emergence of Tinubu as the dominant presidential contender changed the equation.
At the APC presidential convention at Eagle Square, Fayemi eventually stepped down and endorsed Tinubu.
That decision can be read in two ways. It can be viewed simply as an acknowledgement of the political arithmetic confronting his candidacy. It can also be viewed as the decision of a politician unwilling to expend political capital on a contest he could not win at that particular moment.

The latter interpretation fits the image of Fayemi as a strategist: knowing not only when to fight, but when not to fight.
Yet it is important not to turn that interpretation into certainty about his private intentions.

Unlike Fashola, Fayemi Remains Politically Active
The contrast with Fashola becomes sharper here.
After leaving government, Fashola has increasingly presented himself as a former public official and professional who can remain influential without appearing to be permanently in pursuit of elective office.

Fayemi has remained much more visibly engaged in national political conversations.
His criticism of aspects of the Tinubu administration has also distinguished him from Fashola’s more restrained public posture.
That does not automatically make Fayemi an opponent of Tinubu or an ally of the opposition. Nigerian politics rarely fits neatly into such categories.

A politician can criticise a government’s policies while remaining within the governing political family. Equally, a politician can praise a government while positioning himself for a future contest.

That ambiguity is central to understanding Fayemi.

The 2031 Question
Fayemi himself has previously suggested that stepping down for Tinubu did not mean abandoning his presidential ambition.
That statement gives greater significance to his continuing political activity.

If he eventually seeks the presidency again, the central question will not simply be whether Fayemi possesses the intellectual credentials or political experience. It will be whether he can construct the coalition necessary to translate those assets into national electoral power.
That is where the comparison with IBB becomes particularly interesting.

Babangida understood coalition-building, timing and political accommodation. Fayemi’s career suggests a similar appreciation of the importance of timing, although within a completely different constitutional and political environment.

Fashola represents another path: governance first, politics second.
Fayemi represents a more complicated trajectory: activism, governance, party politics, intellectual engagement and continued national positioning.

IBB represents the old-school model of power management, political ambiguity and strategic manoeuvring from the centre.

The Real Fayemi Puzzle
The most consequential question about Fayemi may therefore not be whether he is a “chameleon”, as some of his critics portray him.
The more useful question is what political constituency Fayemi ultimately wants to build.
His history gives him relationships with the progressive tradition, the South-West political establishment, former governors, civil society activists and sections of the intellectual community.

That breadth can be an advantage. It can also create suspicion among politicians who want absolute clarity about where an ally stands.
This is where the Fashola comparison is instructive.

Fashola’s political communication has generally been easier to read: he speaks as a former governor, lawyer and technocrat who is careful about open political confrontation.
Fayemi’s positioning is less straightforward. His history contains activism, party combat, electoral battles, executive office and presidential ambition.

And that makes him a more difficult political figure to categorise.
Whether that ultimately becomes an asset or a liability will depend less on labels such as “hero”, “villain” or “chameleon” than on one thing Nigerian politics repeatedly demonstrates:
the ability to build and sustain alliances when the numbers begin to matter.